Logic: an electronic educational visual aid for cadets and students of the Krasnodar University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia

Judgment as a form of thinking contains two types of information:

• the main one, which finds explicit expression in the subject and predicate of the judgment, in the logical connective and quantifiers;
• additional, which relates to the characteristics of the logical or factual status of a judgment, to its evaluative and other characteristics (the modality of the judgment).

Modality is additional information explicitly or implicitly expressed in a judgment about the degree of its validity, logical or factual status, about its regulatory, evaluative and other characteristics.

It may be expressed in separate words, or it may not have an explicit expression. In this case, it is revealed by analyzing the context.

Judgments are called modal when they not only note the connection between the subject and the predicate, but also characterize this connection or express the attitude of the author of the judgment towards it.

Words indicating the nature of the connection are called modal operators . Sometimes they are not stated directly, but from the context it is clear that they are implied.

In general, the modality of any judgment (p) can be represented using the operator M according to the scheme Mp, for example: “P is necessary.”

More about modal characteristics

Modal characteristics of judgments are usually expressed in pair categories: necessity - accident, obligation - prohibition, proven - disproven, etc.

One of these characteristics is considered strong - for example, necessity, while the other, defined through the negation of the first, is considered weak - for example, chance.

Let us consider the epistemic, deontic and alethic modalities of judgments that are cognitively important and of particular significance for legal thinking.

Alethic types of judgment

The operators of alethic modality are the words “possibly”, “impossible”, “accidentally”, “necessary”. Let's look at the types of operators using an example:

1. Random - these are isolated statements that are considered within the framework of some unique, specific event. A good example is the historical event - “On April 12, 1961, the first manned flight into space took place.” The event accidentally coincided with the calendar date. The number and the accomplished fact have a relationship of chance between themselves (the flight could have been carried out with equal probability on April 16 and April 20).
2. Possible (impossible) are judgments that describe the likelihood of some fact happening in reality. In this case, a preliminary accumulation of information occurs, tracing signs of a pattern. From this side, all potential events that are connected in one system of phenomena can be equally realized in the world. For example, “it is possible that it will rain in Moscow.” The expectation of precipitation in Moscow may be confirmed over time, or it may not (“no” - in cases of weather clearing - the onset of another alternative event, in order of time sequence).
3. Necessity - this modal operator indicates the necessity of connecting two phenomena. In most cases, it describes the property of a real object (object), based on its natural essence and physical relationship with others that constitute the conditions for the manifestation of this property. For example, “it is necessary that ultraviolet rays destroy bacteria and viruses.”

Kinesthetic channel of perception

This is a modality of sensations, that is, bodily perception, which is designated as “somatic sensations.” They, in turn, are divided into internal (pain, relaxation and tension, muscle feeling, sensation of movement and posture, work of internal organs) and external (temperature (cold and heat), vibration, pressure).

Kinesthetic channels of perception are closely intertwined with emotions, which reflect the same internal sensations, and are verbally described in the same way as they are. For example, “light at heart.”

There is also an osmic modality of sensations (olfactory - taste and smell). Most often, this channel of perception is combined with the kinesthetic one. However, smell and taste belong to completely different perception systems, but still a person analyzes them simultaneously, and in this regard they are grouped together. An example would be the expressions: “delicate taste”, “sweet smell”, etc.

Without smell, the entire flavor palette is significantly lost. In practice, this can be confirmed by the common phenomenon when a person with an impaired sense of smell (nasal congestion) takes food that seems tasteless and insipid to him, although the organ responsible for taste functions normally.

On the issue of modality in logic and linguistics

There are different, sometimes very contradictory, points of view on the category of modality in both logic and linguistics. Conflicting interpretations of the problem of modality can be explained by a diverse approach to the question of the nature of the category under consideration.

The concept of modality, as is known, came to linguistics from logic. Modality in logic /lat. modus - measure, method / is interpreted as a necessary characteristic and the most important property of a judgment, since it determines the content of the judgment in terms of the nature of the relationship between the object and the attribute, the degree of connection of the subject of the judgment with its predicate [1, p. 359]. At the same time, in modern logic there is a lack of unity in the interpretation of the essence of the modality of judgment. According to one of the interpretations of the essence of the modality of judgment [2, p. 9; 107] as a result of emphasizing the subjective assessment of the connection between the subject of judgment and the predicate, modality is understood as the degree of reliability, from the point of view of the speaker, of the thought that is expressed in the sentence. Proponents of this point of view distinguish two main types of judgments by modality: probable and reliable. Reliable judgments, in turn, are divided into judgments of reality and judgments of necessity. According to another point of view [3, p. eleven; 38], which goes back to Aristotle, every judgment is a judgment about what is possibly inherent, or about what is necessarily inherent in the relations between objects or phenomena of reality. Judgments, according to Aristotle, by combining a subject and a predicate express three types of modality: possibility, necessity, reality. I. Kant also identified three types of judgments: problematic (modality is accompanied by consciousness of only possibility), apodictic (modality is accompanied by consciousness of the necessity of judgment), assertoric (modality is accompanied by consciousness of reality). Thus, modality is understood as a mental category that reflects reality taken from the “modus” of existence of real objects and phenomena. Modality is understood as the nature of objective connections and, depending on the nature of objective connections, judgments have three types of modality.

In modern linguistics there is also no consensus on issues related to the essence of the category of modality. Some linguists define modality as “a phenomenon at the logical-grammatical level” [4, p. 200], others present modality as a functional-semantic category [5, p. 303]. Today in linguistics two main points of view can be distinguished on the category of modality: 1/ modality is a linguistic (syntactic or grammatical) category [V. V. Vinogradov, G. A. Zolotova, etc.] and 2/ modality - conceptual (general semantic) category [G. V. Kolshansky, I. B. Khlebnikova, etc.]. Modality as a conceptual category is also presented in the dictionary of linguistic terms [6, p. 237], and in the scientific works of a number of famous domestic and foreign linguists [7, p. 9].

If in linguistics there is no consensus on the most basic questions concerning the essence of the category of modality, its relationship to the modality of thought, its relationship to predicativity, then, now, apparently, the only thing that does not cause disagreement is that in modern English / also as in other Indo-European languages, modality is expressed by a variety of linguistic means: grammatical, lexical and prosodic.

Each language has specific, unique means for expressing any of the conceptual categories. If in logic we find only two or three types of modality, then in language, as is known, modality acquires and manifests a different content than in logic. Linguistics distinguishes a number of different degrees and shades of these categories based on the study of the semantics of linguistic forms. The problem of modality in linguistics, in our opinion, should be considered as a problem of expressing a certain generalized meaning that receives one or another expression in a particular language. Linguists do have the problem of expressing a certain set of modal meanings and submeanings in specific / but varied / linguistic forms of a particular language.

“The essence of modal meanings determines the fact that they are realized mainly in the predicate: this follows from the very logical nature of modality, which affirms the nature and content of the connection between the subject and the predicate of the judgment” [8, p. 9]. Modal content in language is thus realized primarily within the predicative relation in a sentence, on a predicative basis, which is a condition for the existence of the message itself. Modality as a complex of meanings in a language must be conveyed primarily in the lexical meaning of the verb and in the semantics of words in the predicative function that carries out the task of the message. The content of the general semantic category of modality is the expression of various shades and degrees of possibility and necessity of connections between objects or phenomena of reality established in the public consciousness. This formulation of the question of modality in linguistics seems quite convincing, especially since supporters of modality as a semantic category propose moving from disputes over modality to specific linguistic research. For example, a definitional analysis of predicative vocabulary expressing the modality of possibility in the English language, together with an analysis of the distributional and contextual conditions for the implementation of the meanings of this vocabulary, allowed us to identify a number of very different shades and degrees of the concept under consideration: conjecture, ability, certainty-confidence, uncertainty- doubt, request for permission, chance, probability, etc. [9, p. 25]. A component analysis of the content plan of predicative vocabulary expressing the modality of necessity made it possible to identify a whole complex of meanings and sub-meanings of necessity: duty, obligation, compulsion, obligation, desire, will, etc. [10, p. 20].

The conducted studies, which make it possible to systematize predicative expressions of the aspects of modality under consideration, confirm that modal content in language is indeed realized on a predicative basis. The modality of possibility /and the modality of necessity/ as a set, a complex of “meanings” and “sub-meanings” of the above key shades and degrees of possibility /and necessity/ in modern English is conveyed primarily in the semantics of modal verbs, as well as in the semantics of full-valued predicative vocabulary, correlated with concept being studied. The analysis showed that, in fact, modality is primarily characteristic of the verb and the study of modal meanings should begin with an analysis of the grammar and semantics of verbs and other meaningful predicative words correlated with this concept.

Literature:

1. See, for example: Kondakov N.I. Logical dictionary-reference book. M.: Nauka, 1975. P. 359.

2. See: Tavanets P.V. Judgment and its types. M., 1953. S. 9.; Gorsky D. P. Logic. M., 1963. P. 107.

3. See: Aristotle. Analysts. First and second. Translation from Greek - M., 1952. P. 11; Kant I. Logic. Petrograd, 1915. P. 38.

4. Panfilov V.Z. The relationship between language and thinking. M.: Nauka, 1971. P. 200.

5. See, for example: Linguistic Encyclopedic Dictionary. M.: Soviet Encyclopedia, 1990. P. 303.

6. Akhmanova O. S. Dictionary of linguistic terms. M., 1969. P. 237.

7. See, for example: Khlebnikova I. B. Subjunctive mood (as a general linguistic problem). Kalinin: Kalinin State Pedagogical Institute named after. M. I. Kalinina, 1971; Kolshansky G.V. On the issue of the content of the linguistic category of modality. // Questions of linguistics. 1961. No. 1.; Diver W. The modal system of the English Verb. —Word, v. 20, No. 3, 1964; Hermeren L. On modality in English: a study of the semantics of the modals. — Lund, 1978.

8. Khlebnikova I. B. Subjunctive mood (as a general linguistic problem). Kalinin: Kalinin State Pedagogical Institute named after. M.I. Kalinina, 1971. P. 9.

9. See: Lomaev B. F. Paradigmatic and syntagmatic characteristics of predicative vocabulary expressing the modality of possibility in modern English: Author's abstract. dis. ...cand. Philol. Sci. - Kalinin State. University, 1974.

10. See: Filippov V.N. Experience of component analysis of the content plan of vocabulary correlated with the concept of “necessity”, and the predicate expression of this concept: Abstract. dis. ...cand. Philol. Sci. - Kalinin State. University, 1971.

Epistemic modality

Epistemic 1 modality is information expressed in a judgment about the grounds for acceptance and the degree of its validity.

The exchange of information between people in the process of communication presupposes a clear understanding of the grounds for acceptance or non-acceptance of opinions, assessments, factual data, etc. expressed in statements. The acceptance of statements depends on many objective and subjective, internal and external factors. The most important among them are logical and
extra-logical
factors that predetermine two epistemic types of judgments that differ in the grounds for their acceptance.
The first type is opinion-based judgments
expressing
faith;
the second type
is logically based
judgments expressing
knowledge.
Faith.

Non-logical factors influencing the making of judgments include: the opinion of authorities, pragmatic interest, traditions, collective and individual suggestion, and others.
This kind of influence can lead to uncritical acceptance of other people’s opinions and the formation of various kinds of beliefs on their basis. In terms of their social orientation, beliefs can be either progressive (belief in a just cause) or reactionary - various kinds of nationalist doctrines, religious fanaticism and other beliefs. According to its epistemic status, faith is a spontaneous, uncritical acceptance of other people's opinions,
true or false, progressive or reactionary.

If the modal operator B denotes belief, i.e. acceptance of the statement p without justification, then the expression B(p)

would mean: “p is accepted on the basis of faith.”

Knowledge.

The factor of logical influence
is the acceptance of a judgment as true or false due to its validity by other judgments, from which the accepted judgment logically follows as a consequence.
A characteristic feature of rationally ori-

The term “Epistemic” comes from the Greek word “episteme”, which in ancient philosophy meant the highest type of undoubted, reliable knowledge

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based cognition - the acceptance of only such judgments that are based on a reliably established empirical or theoretical foundation of proven judgments. This kind of justified judgment acquires the epistemic status of knowledge: K(p), where K is a modal operator meaning “knowledge.”

According to the degree of validity among knowledge, two non-overlapping classes of judgments are distinguished: reliable and
problematic.
1) Reliable judgments are sufficiently justified true or false judgments.

Their truth or falsity is established either by direct verification, or indirectly, when the judgment is confirmed by empirical or theoretical provisions.

The modality of such judgments can be expressed using two operators: evidence (verification) - V and refuted (falsified) - F. A judgment p is proven if it is sufficiently substantiated: Vp .

If the denial of the judgment is sufficiently justified, i.e.
not-p,
then such a judgment is also considered proven: V Ch p. For example, the proposition “It is not true that N was directly involved in the commission of a crime” is proven if an alibi is established, i.e. the fact that N was in another place during the commission of the crime.

Thus, any reliably established judgment can be spoken of as proven, or verified, i.e. Vp

v VI r.

Valid propositions can be expressed using the falsified operator: Fp

v Fl p.

The operators of proof and refuted can be expressed one through the other. Thus, the proof of p is equivalent to the refutation of not-p,

and proving
not-p
is equivalent to disproving p. This equivalence can be represented as follows:

Vp=Flp;

VI p =Fp.

Reliability refers to such a modal characteristic of a judgment, which, like the concepts of truth and falsehood, does not change in degrees. It cannot be said of two statements that one is “more reliable” than the other. If the judgment is sufficiently justified, it is considered proven, thereby reliable, i.e. true or false without changing in degrees.

It should be noted that in psychological terms, reliable knowledge is characterized by the absence of doubts about

the truth of the corresponding judgment. However, the absence of doubt in itself is still

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does not speak about the reliability of a judgment, which is recognized as such only if there are appropriate grounds - logical or empirical.

Alethic modality

In traditional logic, the so-called alethic modalities (from the Greek aletheia - truth, i.e. true, authentic) are most fully studied, in which the degree of indissolubility, immutability of the binding connection between the subject and the predicate is noted: sometimes it can be necessary, sometimes only possible, in other cases the judgment simply notes the factual connection of an object and its properties without further clarification.

Alethic modality is information expressed in a judgment in terms of “necessity-accidentality” or “possibility-impossibility” about the logical or factual determinacy (conditionality) of the judgment.

The judgments with which we operate are accepted as logically significant, i.e. as true or false, not arbitrarily, but for certain reasons. Such grounds that determine the acceptance of judgments are either the structural and logical characteristics of the judgments themselves, or their relationship with the actual state of affairs in reality. Two ways of conditioning or determinism of judgments predetermine the corresponding types of modalities:

1. logical modality and
2. actual modality.

More details

Logical modality

Logical modality is the logical determinacy of a judgment, the truth or falsity of which is determined by the structure or form of the judgment.
Logically true judgments, together with logically false ones, form the class of logically determined judgments. All other judgments, the truth or falsity of which cannot be determined based on their structure, constitute a class of factually determined judgments.

Actual modality

Factual modality is associated with the objective or physical determination of judgments, when their truth and falsity are determined by the state of affairs in reality.

Judgments in which the connection between terms corresponds to real relationships between objects are considered factually true. An example of such a proposition: “The Eiffel Tower is located in Paris.”

Factually false are judgments in which the relationship between terms does not correspond to reality. For example: “No mammal lives in water.”

The objective stability and intensity of real connections between objects is expressed in the actual modality of judgments with the help of alethic modal concepts of necessity and chance.

More details

Thus, a rectangular rhombus is necessarily a square in all cases, therefore, the proposition

"A rectangular rhombus is a square"

is a judgment of necessity or apodictic; These are, as a rule, all statements in mathematics and the exact sciences. That is why here, most often, the specifically necessary nature of judgments is not specified and modal operators are not introduced, although the judgments are apodictic.

Along with them there are judgments of reality, or assertoric ones.

And one more category - judgments of possibility, or problematic. They are found wherever the prospects for upcoming changes are discussed and assumptions are made: “Perhaps the AIDS virus did not exist before,” “Perhaps the deposit will turn out to be promising.”

The study of alethic modality began with Aristotle, since his philosophy assigns a very large role to the category of possibility in its opposition to reality. In possible existence, says the ancient thinker, there are a lot of specific things, for example, there is no ban on contradiction; the spectrum of possibilities contained in any thing fluctuates in scope from one opposite to another, so that in a possibility a thing is both this and not that: copper as a material may become a ball, but perhaps not a ball. Necessary connections, on the contrary, are selective and do not allow variation. An equilateral triangle is always equiangular and cannot be otherwise.

So,

• judgments of necessity (apodictic) - indicate necessary connections of concepts (similar to mathematical ones);
• judgments of reality (assertoric) - indicate the factual connections of concepts;
• judgments of possibility (problematic) - indicate possible connections between concepts.

Non-alethic modalities

Later, non-alethic modalities began to be studied in logic:

1. axiological (value);
2. deontic (prescriptive);
3. temporary;
4. epistemic (cognitive-theoretical).

Usually, in each of them, as in athletics, three categories of judgments are distinguished - two opposite in some respect and one neutral. For example: “earlier”, “simultaneously”, “later”.

More details

Axiological modalities (from the Greek axios - valuable). It combines judgments that evaluate certain phenomena: “good”, “indifferent”, “bad”. This modality is sometimes also called value modality. Statements like: “It’s good that the university is located in the city. It’s bad that prices are increasing” belong to this variety. It goes without saying that in linguistic expressions other words also act as operators: “useful”, “harmful”, “pleases”, “upsets”, “nice”, “disgusting”, etc. This modality can also be expressed in comparative form. Then its modal operators look different: “better”, “equal”, “worse”.

Deontic modality (from the Greek deontos - necessary, due). It covers statements that describe various kinds of regulations (prohibitions) and, above all, moral and legal norms; this may include medical, technical and other recommendations, restrictions, and prohibitions. Modal operators for this are: “mandatory” (“subject to execution”), “indifferent”, “prohibited”; to these three, one additional operator is usually added - “allowed”. There is a branch of ethics called deontology, which deals with the problems of duty and ought. Deontology is also called medical ethics, which prescribes standards of conduct for medical personnel and their relationships with patients.

Temporal modalities , like axiological ones, fall into two varieties:

• absolute (specified by the operators: “always”, “sometimes”, “never”);
• relative (specified by the operators “earlier (than something)”, “simultaneously”, “later (than something)”).

Epistemic modalities (from the Greek episteme - knowledge), this type of modal judgments could also be called epistemological. Here the degree of knowledge of the phenomena referred to in the statements is noted. Depending on whether we are talking about the level of knowledge or the level of belief, two types of epistemic modality are distinguished. One of them is expressed by the operators: “provable” (“verifiable”), “undecidable”, “refutable” (“falsifiable”). For the other, the operators are: “defends” (“convinced”), “doubts,” “rejects.”

Broad and narrow understanding of modality

In linguistics, there have been two main approaches to the category of modality - broad and narrow. Within the first, modality
is generally interpreted as a category of a sentence that expresses the relationship of its content to reality from the point of view of the speaker and includes such aspects of the utterance as its 1. emotiveness/expressiveness, 2. communicative goal setting, 3. negation, 4. evaluativeness, 5. .time.
This understanding of modality is to a greater extent characteristic of Russian Russian studies and is especially clearly visible in the works of V.V. Vinogradov and his followers. Critics of the broad approach to modality point to a number of inevitable difficulties it faces. In particular, they say that modality in this case takes on the form of a comprehensive, all-encompassing linguistic category, extremely heterogeneously structured, with extremely unclear boundaries and blurred content.

Based on the above, many authors refuse
a broad interpretation of the category of modality and concentrate their efforts on developing a more special, narrow understanding of it. This understanding of modality is based on its interpretation in logic, from where, in fact, the term “modality” itself was borrowed by linguistics, as well as the problem of tic associated with this category.

TYPES OF MODALITY AND MEANS OF THEIR EXPRESSION

Zubkov A.D.

Novosibirsk city

TYPES OF MODALITY AND MEANS OF THEIR EXPRESSION

annotation

. In the article, the authors consider two types of modality

(objective and subjective) and their meanings. Note that all languages

express different meanings of modality grammatically differently.

Keywords

: modality, objective modality, subjective

nal modality, meaning, category.

The category of modality is differentiated into two types: objective

and subjective. Objective modality

is mandatory

sign of any statement, one of the categories that form the pre-

Cative unit - sentence. This type of modality expresses

carrying what is communicated to reality in terms of reality (implementation

laziness or feasibility). Objective modality organically

associated with the category of time and differentiated based on time

certainty - uncertainty. The meaning of time and reality – ir-

realities are fused together; the complex of these values ​​is called objective

nomodal values ​​[2, 56].

Within the limits of objective modality, according to V.Z. Panfilov, it follows

distinguish between alethic and deontic (normative) modality. Once-

the difference between them is that in the case of alethic modality in

the proposal fixes the possibility and necessity from the point of view

real (physical) conditions and states (example: Any body, bro-

thrown upward at a speed below the first cosmic speed, must fall to

land). In the case of deontic modality, the sentence expresses

possibility and necessity from the point of view of social norms, ethical

Chinese principles, etc. (example: He must/obliges to intervene in this matter).

Both of these types of objective modality are expressed in language and lexical

skim and grammatical means. Deontic modality form-

mi mood is expressed relatively rarely, only in some languages,

and for these purposes the obligatory mood is used. And it should

note that in the same sentence al-

tic and deontic objective modality. Yes, in a sentence

“He should have gone home at 7 o’clock, but he didn’t make it by that time.”

finish all the work" is expressed in the subjunctive mood

alethic modality of unrealized possibility, and in a word must-

women – deontic modality [2, 72].

Subjective modality

- this is the attitude of the speaker to the communication

to him. Unlike objective modality, it is optional

a significant sign of an utterance. The semantic volume of subjective mo-

ranges are significantly wider than the semantic scope of the objective modal

ness. The semantic basis of subjective modality is formed by the concept

assessments in the broad sense of the word, including not only logical (intellectual)

lectual, rational) qualifications of what is being communicated, but also different

types of emotional (irrational) reaction.

Subjective modality is expressed at the level of logical

grammatical division of the sentence. According to Panfilov [2, 98], logical

the grammatical level is determined by the activity of the cognitive pro-

process of the phenomenon of reality. This subjectivity manifests itself in

that the speaker evaluates the degree of reliability of his thoughts about the action

telnosti. Assessing the degree of reliability of a thought from the subject’s point of view

thoughts at the level of logical-grammatical division receives its form

mal-grammatical expression.

Estimated and characterizing values ​​include values ​​that are combined

containing the expression of a subjective attitude towards what is being communicated with such

its characteristic, which can be considered non-subjective, follows

repentant from the fact itself, the event, from its qualities, properties, from its character

flowing through time or from its connections and relationships with other facts

and events. The sphere of modality includes: the opposition of the statement -

ances by the nature of their communicative attitude; gradations of values ​​in

range “reality – unreality”; different degrees of confidence

who believes in the reliability of the thought he is forming about reality

sti; various modifications of the connection between subject and predicate.

It is important to note that modality is realized either in grammatical or

sometimes at the lexical level, sometimes at the intonation level, sometimes in sections of the utterance

knowledge in general and has different ways of expression, it is expressed

various grammatical and lexical means: special

forms of moods; modal verbs (for example, Russian: mo-

yes, must; English: must, can

); other modal words

(for example, Russian: it seems, perhaps; English: perhaps, likely

); in-

tonal means. Different languages ​​are grammatically different

express different meanings of modality. Thus, English expresses

meaning of unreal modality using special mood

Subjunctive II, for example: If you had come in time, we should

have been able

to catch the train. V.V. Vinogradov in his work “Research on Russian

Russian grammar" [1, 165] adhered to the concept that the proposed

understanding, reflecting reality in its practical social awareness

nii, expresses relatedness (attitude) to reality, therefore with

proposal, the category of mo-

range. Each proposal includes both essential con-

structural feature, modal meaning, that is, it contains an indication

tion on the attitude to reality. He believed that the category is modal

STI belongs to the main, central linguistic categories, in

different forms found in the languages ​​of different systems.

LITERATURE

1. Vinogradov, V.V. On the category of modality and modal words in the Russian language /

V.V. Vinogradov // Selected works: studies on Russian grammar. – M.,

1975.

2. Panfilov, V. Z. The category of modality and its role in the design of structure

proposals and judgments / V. Z. Panfilov // Questions of linguistics. – 1977. – No. 4. –

pp. 37–48.__

Modal propositions. Types of modalities.

Modality - from lat. measure, method.

This is a way of existence or occurrence of phenomena (ontological modality) or a way of understanding judgments about an object (epistemological or logical modality).

Modality is a characteristic of a judgment, depending on the method of establishing reliability, i.e. depending on whether the judgment expresses possibility, reality or necessity.

Types of modality:

1. Alethic (true) modality expresses the nature of the connection between conceivable subjects, i.e. between S and R.

Modal words: perhaps, probably, accurately, accidentally, necessary, maybe, not excluded, “allowed”, etc.

Modality:

a) a judgment about a fact. S is R.

b) the probability of a proposition or the likelihood of something: S is probably P.

c) a judgment about the necessity of something: S, necessary, is P.

2. EPISTEMIC MODALITY. This type of modality is information expressed in a judgment about the nature of acceptance and the degree of validity of knowledge. These are the characteristics of our knowledge. This modality is expressed in the terms “proven”, “refuted”, “neither proven nor disproved”, “knows”, “believes”, “convinced”, “doubts”. The name of epistemic modality comes from the Greek “episteme,” which in ancient philosophy meant the highest type of undoubted, reliable knowledge. We can accept knowledge uncritically, on the basis of faith (“I believe that there are blue cats” or “I deny that Martians came to Earth”), or accept it only on the basis of knowledge (“It has been proven that all people are mortal” and “It has been proven that all people are not mortals").

3. DEONTIC MODALITY. This type of modality is an incentive for people to take specific actions, expressed in a judgment, in the form of advice, wishes, commands, rules of behavior or orders. In other words, these are characteristics of the actions and actions of people in society. This modality is expressed in the terms “obligatory”, “allowed”, “prohibited”, “indifferent” (analogous to the alethic modality “random”). Deontic statements include statements such as “It is forbidden to cross the street at a red light”, “Smoking is not allowed in the classroom”. Deontic statements include various kinds of normative statements, including rules of law, i.e. officially accepted generally binding rules of behavior that regulate legal relations in the social environment.

4. TEMPORARY MODALITY. The temporal modality of judgments is information expressed in a judgment about the sequence of events and their constant or discrete nature of duration. Modality is expressed in terms of “always”, “never”, “only sometimes”, “earlier”, “later”, “simultaneously” (“Student N is always neat”, “Student N is always unkempt”, “Student N is never unkempt” ", "Student N is sometimes neat", "N got married earlier than D", "D got married later than N").

5. AXIOLOGICAL MODALITY. This type of modality is information expressed in a judgment about the value assessment of an act, fact, or event. This modality is expressed in terms of “good”, “bad”, “better”, “worse”, “indifferent”, “equal”. A set of examples of axiologically strong judgments (statements) is the poem by V. Mayakovsky “What is good and what is bad.”

6. SELECTIVE MODALITY. This modality is understood as information expressed in a judgment about the certainty of the subject’s attitude towards a particular proposal, about his position in the process of making decisions, decisions, statements, etc. This type of modality is expressed using the terms “for”, “against”, “ abstains”: “I am for a market economy”, “I am against a market economy”, etc.

Text of the book “Logic. Crib"

General characteristics of judgment

Judgment
is a form of thinking in which the connection between an object and its attribute or the relationship between objects is affirmed or denied and which has the property of expressing either truth or falsehood.

Logical structure of judgment

: S – P, where S is the term of judgment, called the subject of judgment, the concept of the subject of thought, i.e. this is what is thought about in a given judgment; S contains initial knowledge about the subject of the judgment. P is a term of judgment, called a predicate of judgment, a concept about the properties and relations of the subject of thought, i.e. P means the properties and relations of S. P contains new knowledge about the subject of judgment and carries the main semantic load. “—” – connective – an element of judgment that connects both terms of judgment, affirming or denying that the subject belongs to a certain attribute. The connective is expressed by the words “is” (“is not”), “is” (“is not”), etc.

Russian connectives are sometimes not materially expressed, but their absence is significant: the zero connective relates the statement to the real or generalized present.

Both the subject and the predicate in a judgment can be expressed in several words. Thus, in the sentence “Some students are not in class,” the first two words express the subject, the last two words express the predicate, and “are not there” denote the connective.

In any judgment there is a specific thought. It acts as a form of expression of reality in the human mind. This form represents any statement about objects, their properties and states, as well as the relationships between them. Thought is characterized by two very important properties that a person needs to take into account in logical analysis.

Firstly

, she affirms or denies something (“Saratov is larger than Penza”).

Secondly

, a thought can be either true or false. The proposition “Consciousness has an impact on social existence” is true, because a person endowed with consciousness changes the reality around him, including social relations.

In its content, any judgment is attributive in nature. It always reflects the belonging (or non-belonging) of a feature to a specific object and phenomenon. It should be emphasized that the objects of judgment can be any thing, property or relationship of things, a class of objects or some objects of the class. While noting the connection between a judgment and a concept, it is also important to see certain differences between them.

Firstly

, the connection between judgment and concept reflects the objective connection between the general and the individual.

Secondly

, a judgment differs from a concept in genetic and functional aspects. In the genetic aspect, a concept arises on the basis of logical operations to identify the essential characteristics of objects, and a judgment is formed on the basis of establishing a connection between concepts. In the functional aspect, a concept, as is known, reflects an object only in its essential characteristics, while a judgment reflects any characteristics of objects.

Third

, the true act of thought begins with a judgment, that is, with the affirmation or denial of something. If the concept expresses the objective nature of our thinking, then the judgment reveals the active relationship of thought to the surrounding world - a reflection of the objective properties, connections and relationships between objects and phenomena.

Fourth

, a judgment differs from a concept in the way it is consolidated - a sentence.

Judgments express a true or false thought. True Thoughts

- these are judgments in which the connection of concepts correctly reflects the real properties and relationships of the subject of thought.
False thoughts
are judgments in which the connection of concepts distorts the objective properties and relationships of the subject of thought.

Types of judgments

Judgments can be simple or complex (consisting of several simple ones).

Types of simple assertoric judgments. These are judgments that have one subject and one predicate.

There are three types of simple propositions.

1. Judgment-properties

(attributive). They affirm or deny that an object belongs to known properties, states, and types of activity. Examples: “Honey is sweet,” “Chopin is not a playwright.” Schemes of this type of judgment: “S is P” or “S is not P.”

2. Judgments with relationships.

They talk about the relationships between objects: “Every proton is heavier than an electron,” “The French writer Victor Hugo was born later than the French writer Stendhal,” “Fathers are older than their children,” etc.

A formula expressing a judgment with a two-place relation is written as aRb or R(a, b), where a and b are the names of objects, aR is the name of the relation. In a judgment with an attitude, something can be affirmed or denied not only about two, but also about three, four or more objects: “Moscow is located between St. Petersburg and Kiev.”

3. Judgments of existence

(existential). They affirm or deny the existence of objects (material or ideal) in reality. Examples of these judgments: “There are nuclear power plants,” “There are no causeless phenomena.”

In traditional logic, all three types of judgments are simple categorical judgments. Based on the quality of the connective (“is” or “is not”), categorical judgments are divided into affirmative and negative.

Depending on whether the subject is talking about the whole class of objects, a part or one object, judgments are divided into general, particular and individual.

Each judgment has quantitative and qualitative characteristics. Therefore, logic uses a combined classification of judgments by quantity and quality, on the basis of which the following four types of judgments are distinguished

.

1. A is a generally affirmative proposition. Its structure: “All S are P.”

2. I – private affirmative proposition. Its structure: “Some S are P” (“Some lessons stimulate students’ creative activity”). The symbols for affirmative judgments are taken from the word аffirmо – “I affirm”; in this case, the first two vowels are taken: A - to denote a generally affirmative and I - to denote a particular affirmative judgment.

3. E – generally negative judgment. Its structure: “No S is a P.” Example: “No ocean is freshwater.”

4. O – partial negative proposition. Its structure is: “Some S are not P.”

Complex judgments are formed from two or more simple judgments using the logical connectives of conjunction, disjunction, implication, equivalence and negation.

Conjunctive (connective) complex propositions: Petrov is a student and an athlete.

Disjunctive (disjunctive) complex judgments: Petrov is a student or an athlete.

Implicative (conditional) complex propositions: If it rains, then the asphalt is wet.

Equivalent complex propositions: If only a piece of land is surrounded on all sides by water, then it is an island.

Denying complex judgments: Petrov is neither a student nor an athlete.

Thus:

1) a conjunction is true when both simple propositions are true;

2) a loose disjunction is true when at least one simple proposition is true; a strict disjunction is true when only one simple proposition is true;

3) the implication is true in all cases except one: when a is true and b is false;

4) equivalence is true when both propositions are true or both are false.

Relationships between simple and complex propositions

Comparable among simple judgments are judgments that have the same terms and differ in quality

or
quantity
.
Incomparable among simple judgments are those that have different subjects
or
predicates
.

Comparable judgments are divided into compatible and incompatible. Compatible propositions are propositions that can be true at the same time. There are three types of compatibility.

1. Disambiguating

(equivalent) judgments express the same idea: “Student Ivanov made a mistake in logic” and “The reason for the mistake in logic lies in the actions of student Ivanov.” This pair of dissimilar judgments has the same semantic content and a different logical structure.

2. Partial compatibility

(subcontrary) is characteristic of propositions that can be simultaneously true, but cannot be simultaneously (at the same time) false: “Some students know philosophy well” and “Some students do not know philosophy well.”

3. Subordination relationships

are characteristic of judgments that have a common predicate, and the concepts expressing the subjects of two such judgments are in a relationship of logical subordination: “All economically developed countries at the present stage of development use non-traditional methods of mastering resources” and “Some economically developed countries at the present stage of development use non-traditional methods of resource acquisition."
In this case, the first judgment will be subordinate, and the second will be subordinate. If the subordinate is true, the subordinate will always be true. In general, they are characterized by the following dependencies
:

1) if the general judgment is true, the particular will always be true;

2) if a particular judgment is false, the general judgment will also be false;

3) if the general judgment is false, the particular is indefinite;

4) if the subordinate particular judgment is true, the general is indefinite.

Judgments that cannot be true at the same time are incompatible. Such judgments are divided into the following types: counter (opposite); contradictory and contradictory.

1. Contrary

(opposite) are general judgments that express opposing thoughts. These propositions cannot be both true and false at the same time: “All people have birth defects” and “No person has birth defects.” The truth of one of the opposing propositions determines the falsity of the other. If one of the opposing judgments is false, the other remains uncertain.

2. Undercounter

are called private judgments that express the opposite idea: “Some students are excellent students” and “Some students are not excellent students.”

3. Contradictory

judgments that mutually exclude each other are called. They can be neither true nor false at the same time. If one of them is true, the other will be false, and if the first is false, the second will be true: “All people speak Russian” and “Some people do not speak Russian.”

Let us consider the relationships between complex judgments. Comparable among complex propositions are those that have the same components and differ in types of logical connectives, including negation: “Norway or Sweden are members of NATO” and “It is not true that Norway and Sweden are members of NATO.” These judgments can be compared because they have common components, although they differ from each other in logical form: the first of them is a disjunctive judgment, the second is the negation of a conjunction. The presence of common components allows us to compare them in meaning and establish dependencies in truth.

The same types of relationships develop between complex judgments as between simple ones.

Modality of judgments

Let's consider the main types of modalities

– alethic, epistemic, deontic modalities.

Alethic modality

– this is information expressed in terms of necessity or possibility about the logical relationship between the subject and the predicate of a judgment or about the actual relationship between the phenomena reflected in them.

This modality is expressed in the terms “possibly”, “accidentally”, “necessary”, “maybe”, “not excluded”, “allowed” and others and is divided into logical

and
factual
.

A state of affairs may be logically possible or factually possible, logically necessary or factually necessary, logically contingent or factually contingent. What is logically possible is something that does not contradict the laws of logic. It is natural to assert that not everything that is logically possible is actually possible. We know that life on the Moon is impossible (in fact), but the statement “There is life on the Moon” does not contradict the laws of logic, therefore, it is logically possible that there is life on the Moon. In fact, something is possible that does not contradict natural and social laws. What is logically necessary is what is a law of logic. In fact, the laws of nature and social life and the logical consequences from them are necessary.

Epistemic modality.

This type of modality is information expressed in a judgment about the nature of acceptance and the degree of validity of knowledge. These are the characteristics of our knowledge. This modality is expressed in the terms “proven”, “refuted”, “neither proven nor disproved”, “knows”, “believes”, “convinced”, “doubts”. The name of epistemic modality comes from the Greek “episteme,” which in ancient philosophy meant the highest type of undoubted, reliable knowledge. We can accept knowledge uncritically, on the basis of faith (“I believe that there are blue cats” or “I deny that Martians came to Earth”) or accept it only on the basis of knowledge (“It has been proven that all people are mortal” and “It has been proven that that all people are not mortal").

Deontic modality.

This type of modality is an inducement of people to specific actions expressed in a judgment in the form of advice, wishes, commands, rules of behavior or orders. In other words, these are characteristics of the actions and actions of people in society. This modality is expressed in the terms “obligatory”, “allowed”, “prohibited”, “indifferent” (analogous to the alethic modality “random”). Deontic statements include statements such as “It is forbidden to cross the street at a red light”, “Smoking is not allowed in the classroom”. Deontic statements include various kinds of normative statements, including rules of law, that is, officially accepted generally binding rules of behavior that regulate legal relations in the social environment.

There are also types of modality such as:

1) temporary

modality of judgments. This is information expressed in a judgment about the sequence of events and their constant or discrete nature of duration;

2) axiological

modality. This type of modality is information expressed in a judgment about the value assessment of an act, fact, or event. This modality is expressed in terms of “good”, “bad”, “better”, “worse”, “indifferent”, “equal”;

3) electoral

modality. This modality is understood as information expressed in a judgment about the certainty of the subject’s attitude towards a particular proposal, about his position in the process of making decisions, decisions, statements, etc. This type of modality is expressed using the terms “for”, “against”, “ abstains” (“I am for an administrative-command economy” or “I am against an administrative-command economy”).

Structure and types of evidence

There are three components to any proof: thesis

(the position that is going to be proven),
arguments
(statements from which the thesis is deduced according to the rules of logic, they are also called grounds) and
demonstration
, or form of proof (the reasoning itself, showing the connection between the arguments and the thesis).

The process of proof itself, in accordance with its structure, is divided into three stages: formulation of the thesis, search for arguments

, satisfying a number of special requirements, then
constructing a demonstration
and testing it.
One more, fourth, stage can be distinguished - the formation of an evaluative conditional-categorical syllogism
. But its preparation in any case dissolves in the first three stages.

The test result, of course, may turn out to be negative. After all, it cannot be ruled out that the proof was carried out with errors. Then we will be dealing with some version of the refutation.

It is quite acceptable to give the term “proof” an expanded meaning, so that refutation becomes a variation of it. To a certain extent, this is justified and is often done, because as a result of refutation, some firmly established truths also appear, even if their content is not external reality itself, not objects or phenomena, but someone’s statements, which are given a new assessment.

Evidentiary reasoning can be grouped into several varieties according to some common characteristics.

First of all, they are divided into direct and indirect, then indirect ones, in turn, break down into two more subspecies - dividing and well-known from school proofs by contradiction, also called apagogical (from the Greek apagogos - “leading away”, “diverting”, “conclusion” ).

The direct method is the most common and most reliable. When using it, the thesis itself is taken directly, and with the help of various logical procedures it is shown that it follows from some generally accepted premises. All previously studied types of inferences can act as such justifying procedures - from direct in the simplest cases to syllogisms and induction.

Indirect evidence is used in cases where the thesis cannot be directly proven. Therefore, they take some other (albeit necessarily logically related to the thesis) provisions and establish their truth or falsity. Once this is successful, you can draw conclusions about the thesis itself. In a proof by contradiction, the object of attention is first a statement that contradicts the thesis. As is known, contradictory propositions are subject to the law of excluded middle: when one of them is true, the other is necessarily false, and vice versa.

The course of the apagogical proof falls into two nonequilibrium stages. First, an antithesis

and, assuming that it is a true proposition, they begin to test such an assumption. To do this, it is necessary to extract consequences from it and compare them with facts or with some previously established truths, which, therefore, serve as premises. As soon as the comparison leads to at least one contradiction, we can immediately conclude that the assumption we initially made about the truth of the antithesis does not stand up to criticism, which means it must be abandoned as false. From here, at the next stage, a conclusion is drawn about the truth of the thesis as the only one consistent with the nature of things. From now on it is proven.

Unlike apagogical proof, disjunctive proof involves putting forward several alternative propositions.

and subsequent elimination of false ones until only one alternative remains.

Argumentation theory

Argumentation

- this is the presentation of arguments, or arguments, with the intention of arousing or strengthening the support of the other side (audience) of the proposed position. Argumentation is also called a set of such arguments.

Purpose of Argumentation

– acceptance by the audience of the proposed provisions. Arguments can be given not only in support of theses that appear to be true, but also in support of obviously false or vague theses.

In argumentation there is a thesis

- a statement (or system of statements) that the arguing party considers necessary to inspire the audience, and an argument, or argument - one or more interconnected statements intended to support the thesis.

Argumentation theory explores the variety of ways to persuade an audience through speech.

.
You can influence the beliefs of listeners or spectators not only with the help of speech and verbally expressed arguments, but also in many other ways (gesture, facial expressions, visual images, etc. ).
These methods of influence are studied by psychology and art theory, but are not affected by the theory of argumentation.

The theory of argumentation, which began to take shape in Antiquity, has gone through a long history, rich in ups and downs. Currently, we can talk about the formation of a new theory of argumentation, emerging at the intersection of logic, linguistics, psychology, philosophy, hermeneutics, rhetoric, eristics, etc.

The main concepts of the general theory of argumentation are persuasion, acceptance (of statements or concepts), audience, method of argumentation, position of the participant in argumentation, truth and value in argumentation, etc.

The theory of argumentation is not reducible to the logical theory of evidence, which is based on the concept of truth and for which the concepts of persuasion and audience are completely foreign. The theory of argumentation is also not reduced to the methodology of science or the theory of knowledge and to eristics - the theory of dispute, since a dispute is only one of many possible situations of argumentation.

H. Perelman, G. Johnston, F. Eemeren, R. Grootendorst played an important role in the formation of the main ideas of the new theory of argumentation

and etc.

In argumentation theory, argumentation is viewed from three different perspectives, complementary to each other: from the point of view of thinking, from the point of view of man and society, and, finally, from the point of view of history.

The analysis of argumentation as a human activity of a social nature presupposes the study of the audiences in which it unfolds. The narrowest audience includes only the one who puts forward a particular position or opinion and the one whose beliefs he seeks to strengthen or change. A narrow audience could be two people arguing.

The study of the social dimension of argumentation also involves analyzing the dependence of the manner of argumentation on the general characteristics of the specific integral society or community within which it occurs (features of argumentation in medieval feudal society).

The study of the historical dimension of argumentation includes three time slices:

1) taking into account the historically specific time in which the argumentation takes place and which leaves its fleeting mark on it;

2) a study of the style of thinking of a historical era and those features of its culture that leave their indelible imprint on any argumentation related to a given era;

3) analysis of the changes that argumentation undergoes throughout human history. It is in this context that it becomes possible to compare argumentation styles from different historical eras and raise questions about the comparability of these styles and the possible superiority of some of them over others.

Epistemic modality

Epistemological (from the Greek episteme - knowledge) - expresses the degree of acceptance of certain knowledge by the subject. The operators of epistemological modality are “know”, “believe”, “convinced”, “proven”. The statement contains information obtained indirectly, or there is a problem of provability of knowledge. For example, “I believe that God exists,” “I know that it can be cold in the fall.”

The expression that is conveyed using the epistemic operator is not a present fact or a real connection between them (and has almost nothing to do with it). It is given in its entirety to the subject, as a logical conclusion. It follows, as a conclusion, from other knowledge tested by experience. The level of reliability depends on the subjective feeling, the person’s belief in what he is saying. In this, the epistemological modality is almost similar to the alethic one. In contrast, problematic statements, such as those about God, have no way of being proven in any way.

Leading modality

Different people describe the same situations differently. This happens, among other things, because the world around us looks different to us. Each of us is characterized by the perception of the situation through different so-called “channels”. These “channels” are usually called “leading modalities”. Modality is the predominant system of human perception of the surrounding world. The main modalities are of three types: auditory, visual and kinesthetic.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT: There is also a discrete modality, which involves obtaining information about the world through logical conclusions from already existing information. This type of modality is much less common than others, so its inclusion in the structure of the lesson is left to the choice of the teacher or students.

Leading modality

Types of modalities

The auditory modality is characterized by the perception of the world through auditory sensations, that is, a person is mainly guided by what he heard.

For the visual, the main thing is vision, what a person sees.

With the kinesthetic modality, a person perceives the world through the prism of bodily sensations.

In life, it is very rare to meet a “pure” visual, kinesthetic or auditory learner. More often there are people with mixed types of modalities, but there is always a leading modality. It may well be that in some situation another modality may temporarily replace the leading one and become the main one. But, in most situations, it is through the prism of the leading modality that a person perceives the world.

The predominant modality of a person can be determined by the speech of the interlocutor, in his words, how and what he says. People present the same information in different ways. It is necessary to pay attention to the words a person uses. This will allow you in further communication (having already determined the leading modality) to speak with the person “in the same language,” which will help your interlocutor to “receive” information from you faster. As a result, the actions of your interlocutor will be more productive (especially important when communicating between a manager and a subordinate; when providing support and assistance to someone).

Mutual translation of the language of modalities

Determining which leading modality a person has is useful not only for working with victims in an emergency zone, but also in everyday life, communicating with your friends and colleagues, as well as for better establishing contact with people you barely know.

METHODOLOGICAL RECOMMENDATIONS: Next, an exercise is carried out aimed at developing the skill of determining the leading modality. (Handout - Appendix 8).

Exercise “Leading modality”

Goal: to develop the skill of determining the leading modality.

Instructions

To determine the leading modality in the group, three pre-prepared texts are read, from which the group determines the predominant modality: first the teacher reads the text, then the group jointly comes to a conclusion. The following is a discussion aimed at justifying each conclusion.

Texts for identifying leading modalities

1text

Imagine that you are going to see a dentist. Rain on the street. Large large drops of rain fall on your face, neck, hands. The skin becomes cool and discomfort is felt. Your feet are wet and you feel an unpleasant dampness. Before entering the office, your legs become weak and heavy with fear, every muscle instantly begins to turn to stone. You are in a chair. You find it difficult to breathe. By an effort of will, you open your mouth, which is completely inconvenient to keep open - your jaws get tired, it’s difficult to swallow saliva. Your breathing quickens, anxiety overwhelms you, and you, with every fiber of your soul, expect the procedure to end as soon as possible.

2 text

You go to the dentist. Rain on the street. The noise from cars driving through puddles is unpleasant. You approach the clinic. The door creaks disgustingly. Take your turn. In the corridor there is a constant noise of loud voices and a drill. You enter the office. The specific smell of medicine makes it difficult to breathe. The doctor has a sharp, unpleasant voice. The sound of the drill lasts a long time, almost endlessly. Finally it was all over. You go outside, where the rain continues, accompanied by thunder.

3 text

You go to the dentist. Rain on the street. Multi-colored foreign cars drive mercilessly through puddles, dousing passers-by. Approach the clinic. The door has been recently painted a light green with beautifully matching gold lettering on the sign. You take a queue in the corridor. The renovation has not yet reached this point - the dim light makes the corridor even narrower, the walls, once painted blue, seem brown. Enter the office. The doctor is wearing a wrinkled, gray robe, and honey. my sister hasn't cleaned her shoes for a long time. You sit in a chair awaiting the upcoming procedure.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONDUCT: At the end of this part, it is necessary to conduct a survey. Approximate questions for discussion:

– What did the group learn about modalities?

– Is there a need to define them? For what?

– Could this be useful at work? For what?

After the discussion, the facilitator summarizes the above.

Sources:

• Vasilyuk F. E., Psychology of experience (M.: Moscow University Publishing House, 1984).
• Osukhova N.G. Psychological assistance in difficult and extreme situations: Proc. aid for students higher educational institutions / M.: Publishing House, 2005.
• Romek V. G., Kontorovich V. A., Krukovich E. I. Psychological assistance in crisis situations. - St. Petersburg: Rech, 2005.
• Manual “Emergency Psychological Assistance”, State Institution “TsEPP EMERCOM of Russia”. Moscow "Publishing House NC ENAO". 2001.
• Methodological recommendations for “Initial training of rescuers of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia.” State Institution "TsEPP EMERCOM of Russia", 2009.

Deontic modality

Deontic judgments refer to expressions in ready-made systems created by society - legal, moral, ethical and even mathematical. The object is considered from the point of view of established rules. The operators of deontic judgments are “allowed”, “prohibited”, “should”. In some cases, their meaning contains a connotation of advice or instruction. For example, “one should respect the free will of another person.”

An event or action may be physically (or technically) possible, but is not justified from the point of view of the realm of deontic logic. It involves the social mind - one of the states of consciousness that is formed under the influence of the society or religion where a person lives. For example, from a logical point of view - slavery is neither good nor bad - if it exists, then the judgment about it will be true, as will the description of the system of slavery. From a legal point of view, it is a violation of human rights and freedoms.

Types of alethic modality

They are represented by the following restrictions:

1. Problematic (judgment regarding the possibility of an event occurring). Now the above example takes the following form: In Russia, reforms can be carried out in relation to the Armed Forces. Assertoric (judgments about a really existing fact). For example: In Russia, the Armed Forces are currently undergoing reform. As can be seen from the example, there is no expression of modality, but only the immediate fact of what is happening is stated.
2. Apodictic (judgments regarding the necessity of an event). Example: In Russia it is necessary to carry out a number of reforms in relation to the Armed Forces.

Judgment modalities, types

Based on the rules of traditional logic, mathematical algorithms and computer programs are constructed. However, a person, unlike a computer, can afford to direct thoughts into the future, express ideas, hypotheses. Therefore, all theoretical reasoning is built within the framework of modal logics. Naturally, not every spontaneous thought is feasible and meets human expectations.

For example, “it is possible that there is life on Mars” - we cannot fully accept this statement as true - a person has knowledge about the planet Mars only indirectly (no one has flown there or observed signs of life with their own eyes), but also accept it as false Without evidence to the contrary, it is impossible. Such judgments are problematic in nature and are called alethic. This includes both logical statements and ontological ones.

Types and types of modal judgments. Assertoric and modal judgments.

Any judgment asserts the presence or absence of a particular situation. However, some situations in life are not simply present or absent, but present or absent by chance or necessity. If we are talking about the future, then we can characterize individual situations as possible or necessary, or as impossible, etc. Some actions and actions of people in society are permitted, others are even obligatory, and some are prohibited. As for judgments about our knowledge, the knowledge discussed in the judgment can be proven or unproven, reliable or not, etc.

Depending on whether judgments contain similar characteristics of phenomena, events, processes, etc., they are divided into assertoric and modal.

Assertoric are judgments that contain only some information and do not contain an evaluation of this information.

Example. “Man is a thinking being”; "Some swans are white."

Modal are judgments that contain an assessment of the information contained in them.

Example. “There may be life on Mars”; “Every person is obliged to obey the law”; “It is possible that extraterrestrial civilizations exist”; “The search must be carried out in the presence of witnesses”; “Sometimes students get excellent marks in exams by accident.”

All judgments expressing the laws of specific sciences are modal. By asserting the presence of any connection in the formulation of the laws of science, we affirm the necessary nature of this connection.

In some cases, in modal judgments, the characteristics of the situations they are talking about are not expressed explicitly, but are implied.

Examples: “No man can live without food”; "Some people can't lie."

There are several types of modalities, and within each type there are several types. Types of modalities correspond to the so-called modal operators - special words with the help of which the assessment (characterization) of the information contained in the judgment is carried out.

Alethic modality. Its types: “necessary”, “possible”, “impossible”, “accidental”.

Example. "Chance of rain tomorrow."

The following relations exist between the operators of this modality:

“It is necessary to A” ~ “It is impossible not to A.”

“Perhaps A” ~ “Not necessarily not-A.”

“Randomly A” ~ “Possibly A and possibly not-A.”

Alethic modalities have special significance in science. Science, first of all, is interested in natural connections between phenomena, the causality of phenomena, the possibility or impossibility of certain phenomena under certain circumstances. In general, when they talk about science, they mean a system of necessary knowledge.

Questions about what the necessity of some connection between phenomena or some event means, what is the meaning of a statement about the possibility of something, what grounds are needed to recognize the truth of statements about the necessity or possibility of some situations, have not been clarified to any sufficient extent. in philosophy, nor in logic. In philosophy, we usually limit ourselves to some metaphors, such as the fact that the necessary is “solid, stable in phenomena.”

Deontic modality is the characteristics of the actions and actions of people in society. Its types: “obligatory”, “allowed”, “prohibited”, “indifferent”.

Example. "No outsiders allowed."

The following relationships exist between the operators of this modality:

“Required A” ~ “Not allowed non-A.”

“Allowed A” ~ “Not necessarily non-A.”

“Forbidden A” ~ “Not allowed A” or “Must not-A.”

Epistemic modality indicates the scientific reliability of the information contained in the judgment, i.e. these are the characteristics of our knowledge. Types of epistemic modality: “proven”, “refuted”, “possible” (assuming that some statement is true), “knows”, “believes”, “convinced”, “doubts”.

Example. “It has been proven that the Earth revolves around the Sun.”

The relationships between the operators of this modality are as follows:

“Proved A” ~ “Refutable non-A.”

“Proved not-A” ~ “Refutable A.”

In addition to those mentioned, axiological modality (“good”, “bad”) and temporal modality (“always”, “sometimes”, “never”, etc.) are quite common.

The following notation is used to write modal statements:

Alethic modality: ð (N) - necessity; à (M) — possibility; ∆ (S) - randomness.

Deontic modality: O – obligatory; P – allowed; Z – prohibited.

Epistemic modality: D – proven; Op – refuted; K - knows.

Example. "KA" means: "Someone knows that situation A occurs."

• 1. Modality of judgments
• 2. Truth of judgments

LECTURE No. 13

Truth and modality of judgments

1. Modality of judgments

Modal judgment

- this is a separate type of judgment, which has its own characteristics and is characterized both by the presence of features common to assertoric judgments and by differences from the latter.

Modal judgments are studied within the framework of modal logic, which is heterogeneous in its content and divided into several branches. Among them: logic of time, logic of action, logic of norms, deontic logic, logic of decision making

and etc.

From the point of view of classical logic, one or another judgment can be called assertoric or modal. Obviously, these two types differ from each other. Modal propositions

can be called clarifying.
Judgments of this type not only give a characteristic of a particular object, describe, define it and its inherent properties, but also clarify and complement such a characteristic. In a simplified form, we can say that modal judgments express our attitude towards the object in question. Of course, this feature of modal judgments is reflected in natural language. Thus, in contrast to assertoric judgments (read: simple), modal ones contain a number of special words. For example, “proven”, “mandatory”, “possible”, “good”, “bad”, etc. These words are called modal operators. You can show the difference between assertoric and modal judgments by citing the following sentences: “Tomorrow it will be cold” - this judgment is assertoric;
“Perhaps it will be cold tomorrow” - as is already clear, this is a modal judgment.
From these positions, it can be argued that modal judgments are assertoric judgments supplemented with a specific attitude. However, the role of modal utterances is not limited to simply conveying the speaker’s attitude to the subject. There is a more complex pattern that is not noticeable at first glance: modal judgments reflect the nature of the connection between the subject and the predicate.
In a sense, they create it themselves.

Modal judgments are judgments that reflect the relationship and connection between the subject and the predicate and show the relationship to the subject with the help of modal operators.

In order to better understand the nature of this type of judgment, let us consider a number of examples. We will first give an example of an assertoric judgment, and then a modal one formed from it. “There is not a cloud in the sky and the sun is shining brightly”, “It’s good that there is not a cloud in the sky and the sun is shining brightly”; “Correct posture improves performance”, “Correct posture has been proven to improve performance” and “Pouring cold water improves health”, “Dousing cold water has been proven to improve health.” And also: “The runner in the second lane will come first,” “It is possible that the runner in the second lane will come first”; “Two multiplied by two makes four,” “Obviously, two multiplied by two makes four”; “An electric current, as it passes, heats the conductor” and “It is imperative that the current, as it passes, heats the conductor.”

The difference between assertoric and modal judgments in the examples given is obvious. Let's say the first pair of judgments. “There’s not a cloud in the sky...” is just a statement of fact, a description of two components of clear weather, devoid of evaluation, and with it any feelings and emotions. With the addition of the word “good” to the judgment comes the speaker’s assessment of this weather. From this judgment we can clearly conclude that he likes this kind of weather. The first type of judgment, like the second (i.e., both assertoric and modal judgments) can be either true or false. There is no third option. However, one cannot but agree that modal judgments have more variations and shades. They can often be interpreted differently, which makes it possible for errors to occur in determining their truth or falsity. Here it is necessary to mention that logic in general and modal logic in particular approach the consideration of the meaning of the words “possible”, “necessary”, “proven”, “obligatory”, as well as “necessity”, “obligatory”, “obligatory” derived from them. chance”, “impossibility” from a special point of view. If, from the point of view of natural language, the above words are only words and have different shades and meanings, then logic elevates them to the rank of categories. From this point of view, their interrelations and dependencies are considered. These categories are also considered within the framework of philosophy, which is most interested in their substantive side.

Thus, assertoric judgments

- these are simple judgments in which certain information regarding a particular subject is affirmed or denied. They are also characterized by the fact that they talk about the relationships between the objects reflected in them. There may be two or more such items. To clarify the above, let's give an example: “All professional skiers are athletes.” In this judgment, the concepts of “professional skiers” and “athletes” are correlated, and the first is narrower than the second and is fully included in its scope, but is richer in content, due to the fact that it has more features. A modal judgment, in contrast to an assertoric one, indicates the proof or lack of proof of what is reflected in the judgment, the necessity of a connection between objects or its randomness, the attitude towards the subject of the judgment from the point of view of morality, morality, etc. Modal judgments have the structure: M (S is (or not eat) P).

It must be said that assertoric judgments (as has already been described in other chapters) can be combined into complex ones using logical connectives

(conjunctions, disjunctions, equivalences, implications, negations). Modal operators are also great for complex propositions. In other words, complex propositions can also be modal. In this case, their structure will be as follows: M (a ^b) or M (a V b), etc. You just need to remember that there are five total logical connectives and, accordingly, complex judgments formed from them.

Words in natural language (including Russian) are characterized by a certain ambiguity. In other words, many words have different meanings but sound the same. Others, despite the fact that they differ in sound and spelling, mean the same thing. The latter also applies to modal operators. Thus, one of the modal operators can easily be replaced by another, without losing the implied meaning of the judgment. For example, the judgment “This athlete will probably come running first” will not lose what he has and will not gain something new if he replaces “probably” with “possibly.” Judge for yourself: “Perhaps this athlete will come running first.” This can be done in other cases as well.

Combining the above, we can call complex modal judgments such complex judgments that, with the help of modal operators, reflect the relationships and connections between the simple judgments that are part of it.

As described above, modal statements are formed using modal operators.

The modality of judgments has a number of modal concepts. They are quite well studied and systematized. At the same time, the systematization is based on the strength of modality, as well as its positivity or negativity. There are three basic modal concepts, although some scholars insist on the view that there are four. The three main modal concepts are characterized by the fact that the first of them is strong and positive, the second is a weak characteristic, and the third, in contrast to the first, is a strong negative characteristic. The fourth modal concept is intended in some cases to replace a strong positive concept and a weak characteristic.

Modalities can be logical and ontological, diontic, epistemic, axiological and temporal.

Logical modalities, together with ontological ones, form alethic modalities.

Speaking about the modality of judgments, modal operators have been mentioned more than once. They show the necessity of judgment or its contingency, possibility or impossibility. However, in the process, no definition was given of either truth or falsity and other terms from this series. Meanwhile, knowing the exact meaning of the above categories is important. So, the necessity of judgment means that this judgment is based on a law discovered within the framework of any science, including logic. All reasonable consequences derived from these laws are also recognized as necessary. The determining factor in this case is the factor of objectivity. In other words, the law must be real, not virtual, that is, it must correctly reflect the real state of affairs. Random judgments are defined as statements that, although not directly based on laws known to science, do not contradict them. The same applies to the consequences of these laws. In the case of impossible propositions, everything is obvious. Such judgments are those that contradict scientifically proven laws or their consequences. Possible judgments are based on common sense and do not contradict scientific laws and their consequences.

The above categories are what alethic modalities are studied.

2. Truth of judgments

Moving on to the question of the truth of judgments, it should immediately be said that often determining this factor becomes a difficult task. This may be due to the ambiguity of the words used in the statements, or to the logically incorrect construction of the judgment. The reason may be the complexity of the structure of the judgment itself or the impossibility of determining falsity or truth at a given moment due to the unknown or inaccessibility of the necessary information.

Determining the truth of judgments is directly related to comparability and incomparability.

Comparable judgments are divided into compatible and incompatible.

Incompatible judgments

may be in a relationship of contradiction and opposition. Concepts included in the relation of contradiction are characterized by the fact that they cannot be both true and false. If one of the contradictory propositions is true, then the other is false, and vice versa.

If one of the opposing propositions is true, the other is necessarily false, since they completely exclude each other. Moreover, the falsity of one of the opposing judgments does not mean the falsity or truth of the other. And indeed, the opposite of judgments does not mean that one of them is always true and the other is false. For example: “There is no life on Mars”

and
“There is life on Mars.”
These concepts are uncertain, that is, it is not known whether they are true or false. Both of them may be false. But only one of them can be true.

Compatible judgments

enter into relations of logical
subordination, equivalence
and partial coincidence
(intersection).
Subordinate compatible judgments. They bear this name due to the fact that one of these judgments is included in the scope of the other and is subordinate to it. Such judgments have a common predicate. Determining the truth of judgments that are in a relationship of subordination is associated with certain specifics, since one of the judgments is included in the scope of the second. In this regard, the truth of a general judgment entails the truth of the particular, but the truth of the particular does not reliably determine the truth of the general. The falsity of the general leaves the particular judgment uncertain, and the falsity of the particular does not mean that the general is also false.

Let's give an example: “Ferrari is a good car”

and
“All cars are good.”
The second proposition is false. It is subjugating. Moreover, the private judgment subordinate to it is true.

Relatively speaking, compatible equivalent judgments reflect the same phenomenon or object of the surrounding world

, but they do it differently. So, if we take for consideration two different judgments about one object or phenomenon, that is, two compatible judgments, then we will notice a pattern: in one case, both of these statements will have one subject, but differently expressed (although having the same meaning) predicates . In another case the opposite situation arises. However, in this case we are talking only about equivalent, but in no case about all compatible judgments. It goes without saying that when two judgments are equivalent, identical in meaning, if one of them is false, the second is false, and vice versa.

An example of equivalent compatible propositions are the following statements: “The Moon is a natural satellite of the Earth” and “The Moon is a satellite of the Earth that arose as a result of natural causes.”

When determining the truth of compatible judgments that are not equivalent, it is necessary each time to proceed from the real state of affairs: since compatible concepts often reflect the same object only partially, each of them in this case can be either true or false.

The intersection relation is characterized by the fact that if one such judgment is false, the other is necessarily true. This is due to the fact that such judgments have the same subject and predicate, which nevertheless differ in quality. Moreover, if one of such judgments is true, then regarding the other it is not clear whether it is true or false.

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