Man lives in direct connection with the outside world. He gets to know it, draws some conclusions, reasons. Why do some people perceive the world as bad and others as good? All this is explained by apperception and perception. All this is united into the transcendental unity of apperception. A person experiences the world not as it is, but through a prism. The online magazine psytheater.com will talk about this in more detail.
The world is cruel? Is he unfair? Finding himself in a situation of pain and suffering, a person suddenly begins to think about what kind of world he lives in. While everything in his life is going well and wonderful, he doesn’t think much about this topic. A person doesn’t care about the world as long as everything goes “like clockwork” for him. But as soon as life turns in a direction unsuitable for a person, he suddenly begins to think about the meaning of his existence, about people and about the world that surrounds him.
Is the world as bad as many people think it is? No. In fact, people do not live in the world in which they appeared. It all depends on how people look at what surrounds them. The world looks different in the eyes of every person. A botanist, a lumberjack and an artist look at trees differently when they get into the forest. Is the world bad, cruel and unfair? No. This is how those people who call him such words look at him.
If we return to the fact that a person usually begins to evaluate the world around him only when something in his life is not going as he would like, then it is not surprising why the world itself seems cruel and unfair to him. The world itself has always been the way you see it. And it doesn’t matter whether you look at the world in a good mood or in a bad one. The world does not change just because you are sad or happy now. The world is always the same for everyone. It’s just that people themselves look at him differently. Depending on how you look at him, he becomes for you the way you see him.
Moreover, note that the world agrees with any point of view, since it is so diverse that it can correspond to any idea about it. The world is neither good nor bad. It simply has everything: both good and bad. It’s only when you look at it that you see one thing without noticing everything else. It turns out that the world is the same for all people, only people themselves see it differently depending on what they pay their personal attention to.
Unity and identity
The environment depends on what things a person pays attention to most. His sense of self is determined solely by his own opinion, attitude to circumstances and everything that happens around him. Unity and identity in the self-awareness of the subject is a prerequisite for cognitive synthesis. This is the transcendental unity of apperception, which should cut off any anomalies in the individual’s thinking.
What a person thinks, how he feels about current events - all this determines his emotions, feelings and forms a certain idea, point of view and similar manifestations. Anything that is within the control of the human mind can happen in the world. Such a concept as the transcendental unity of apperception presupposes the presence of self-awareness, reflecting a person’s way of thinking in relation to any event in life and the world around him without the manifestation of sensory evaluation.
Conformity and nonconformity
It is important to have tolerance and not be surprised by the presence of a variety of things in the world at the same time: beautiful and terrible. What does it mean to be tolerant? It is to consciously accept the imperfection of the world and oneself. You need to understand that everyone can make mistakes. The world is not perfect. And this is due to the fact that everything around a person may not correspond to his or another person’s idea.
For example, they want to see someone as a brunette, but he is a redhead. Or the child should be calm and obedient, but he is restless and naughty. Therefore, the transcendental unity of apperception presupposes tolerance, which manifests itself in the fact that there is an understanding of the possible inconsistency of other people and the world around one’s expectations and ideas. The world is as it is - real and permanent. Only the person himself and his worldview change.
Different people - different perceptions
In philosophy, the transcendental unity of apperceptions is a concept introduced by Kant. He first used it in his work "Critique of Pure Reason".
The philosopher separates original and empirical apperception. In life you can often encounter a situation where people, being participants in the same events, can talk about them in different ways. It depends on the person's personal perception. And it happens that one gets the impression that these are completely different cases, although they are talking about the same thing.
What is apperception?
This is a conditional perception of everything that surrounds a person. It depends on personal experience, ideas and acquired knowledge. For example, a person engaged in design, entering a room, will first of all evaluate its furnishings, color design, arrangement of objects, etc. Another person, a florist, entering the same room, will pay attention to the presence of flowers, what they are like and how they are cared for. Consequently, the same room will be perceived and evaluated differently by two different people.
In philosophy, the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception suggests that the revealed structure of the self can be used to explain a priori synthetic cognitions. This meaning is embedded in the concept of “transcendental”.
Perception in psychology
- Categorization. Any object is perceived as a member of a generalized class. The specific properties of the group are transferred to the object itself.
- Verbal mediation. Due to this property, the individual properties of objects are abstracted and generalized.
- Influence of attitudes. We can say that this is an almost unconscious ability to feel, react and perceive as experience and motives suggest.
- Subjectivity. Depending on their individual factors, different people perceive the same object differently.
- Apperception. The perception of any content is determined by past impressions and knowledge.
One of the founders of Gestalt psychology, M. Wertheimer, derived six laws of perception. These include:
- Proximity effect (merging nearby figures).
- Similarity effect (objects similar in color, shape, etc. are grouped).
- Factor of “common fate” (objects are united according to the changes that occur in them).
- Closedness factor (better perception of figures that are closed).
- Grouping factor without remainder (they try to group a number of objects so that there are no separate figures).
- “Good continuation” factor (choosing the less curved line from two intersecting or touching ones).
Forms and laws
Kant says that, knowing the pure forms of such synthesis, by which he understands categories, people can anticipate laws. In turn, these laws must obey phenomena as a consequence of possible experience. Otherwise, these laws will not reach empirical consciousness and will not be perceived.
Therefore, the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception presupposes the highest principle of knowledge, which is analytical in nature. The very concept of “I” already has the idea of a synthesis within it of all possible ideas. But the analytical unity of apperception itself can take place solely due to its original synthetic nature. Kant calls the connection with objective categorical syntheses the objective unity of self-consciousness. It is different from subjective, which is based on chance or personal associations.
Text of the book “Works”
Transcendental deduction of pure concepts of the understanding
§ 15. On the possibility of communication in general
The manifold [content] of representations can only be given in sensuous intuition, that is, in intuition, which is nothing other than receptivity, and its form can a priori lie in our ability to represent, being, however, only the way in which it is subjected to exposed subject. But the connection
(conjunctio) of the manifold can never be perceived by us through the senses and, therefore, cannot also be contained in the pure form of sensory intuition, because it is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation, and since this faculty, unlike sensuality, must be called understanding, then any connection - whether we are conscious of it or not, whether it is a connection of the manifold in intuition or in various concepts, and whether intuition is sensual or insensible - is an action of the understanding, which we designate with the general name of
synthesis,
in order to also note that we cannot do anything imagine being bound in an object that you yourself have not previously bound;
among all representations, connection
is the only one that is not given by the object, but can only be created by the subject himself, for it is an act of his initiative.
It is not difficult to see that this action must be originally united, that it must have the same significance for every connection, and that decomposition (analysis),
which seems to be the opposite of it, always nevertheless presupposes it;
in fact, where the understanding has not previously connected anything, it has nothing to dissolve, since only thanks to the understanding
is something given to the faculty of representation as connected.
But the concept of connection contains, in addition to the concept of the diverse and its synthesis, also the concept of the unity of the diverse. Communication is the idea of the synthetic
unity of diversity[39]. Consequently, the idea of this unity cannot arise from connection; rather, on the contrary, it makes the concept of connection possible primarily due to the fact that it is attached to the idea of diversity. This unity, which a priori precedes all concepts of connection, is not the category of unity mentioned above (§ 10), since all categories are based on logical functions in judgments, and in them the connection, therefore, the unity of these concepts, is already thought of. Consequently, the category already presupposes a connection. Therefore, we must look for this unity (as a qualitative one, § 12) even higher, namely in that which contains the very basis of the unity of various concepts in judgments, therefore, the basis of the possibility of understanding even in its logical application.
§ 16. On the original synthetic unity of apperception
It must be possible
so that [the judgment]
I think
accompanies all my ideas;
otherwise, something would be imagined in me that could not be thought at all, in other words, the idea would either be impossible, or at least for me it would be nothing. Representation, which can be given before any thinking, is called intuition.
Everything that is manifold in intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to [the judgment]
I think
in the very subject in which this manifold is located.
But this representation is an act of spontaneity,
that is, it cannot be considered as belonging to sensibility.
I call it pure apperception
to distinguish it from
empirical
apperception;
it is self-consciousness, generating the representation I think,
which must be able to accompany all other representations and be one and the same in every consciousness;
Consequently, this self-consciousness cannot be accompanied by any other [representation], and therefore I also call it original apperception.
I also call its unity
the transcendental
unity of self-consciousness in order to designate the possibility of a priori knowledge on the basis of this unity.
Indeed, the manifold ideas given in some intuition would not all be my
ideas if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness;
in other words, as my ideas (even if I do not recognize them as such), they must nevertheless necessarily be consistent with the condition under which the only condition is that they can
be together in one common self-consciousness, since otherwise they would not all belong to me. Many conclusions can be drawn from this initial connection.
Firstly, this universal identity of apperception of the given in the contemplation of the manifold contains within itself a synthesis of representations and is possible only through the awareness of this synthesis. In fact, the empirical consciousness that accompanies various representations is itself fragmented and has no relation to the identity of the subject. Consequently, this relationship does not yet arise because I accompany every idea with consciousness, but is achieved by the fact that I attach
one idea to another and I am aware of their synthesis.
So, only due to the fact that I can connect the diverse [contents] of given representations in one consciousness,
it is possible for me to imagine
the identity of consciousness
in
these very representations;
in other words,
the analytical
unity of apperception is possible only if we assume the existence of some
synthetic
unity of apperception[40].
That is why the thought that all the representations given in contemplation collectively belong to me
means that I unite them in one self-consciousness, or at least I can unite them in it, and although this thought itself is not yet awareness of
the synthesis
of representations, nevertheless less does it presuppose the possibility of it;
in other words, only by virtue of the fact that I can comprehend the diverse [contents of] representations in one consciousness, I call them all my
representations;
otherwise I would have as variegated a varied Self
(Selbst) as I have the ideas I am conscious of.
Thus, the synthetic unity of the manifold [contents of] intuitions, as given a priori, is the basis of the identity of apperception itself, which a priori precedes all of my
determined thinking. However, it is not the object that contains a connection that can be borrowed from it through perception, only thanks to which it can be perceived by the understanding, but the connection itself is a function of the understanding, and the understanding itself is nothing other than the ability a priori to connect and sum up the diverse [contents ] of these representations under the unity of apperception. This principle is the highest principle in all human knowledge.
This principle of the necessary unity of apperception itself, it is true, has the character of an identity, that is, it represents an analytical position, but nevertheless it explains the need for synthesis of the given in the contemplation of the manifold, and without this synthesis the complete identity of self-consciousness cannot be conceived. In fact, I
as a simple representation does not yet give anything diverse;
the manifold can only be given in contemplation distinct from the Self
, and it can be thought in one consciousness thanks to connection.
An understanding in which all that is manifold would also be given by self-consciousness would be contemplative
understanding;
Meanwhile, our understanding can only think,
and it must receive intuitions from the senses.
So, I am conscious of my identical Self
(Selbst) in relation to the manifold [contents] of the representations given to me in contemplation, because I call them all
my
representations, constituting one representation. But this means that I am a priori aware of their necessary synthesis, called the original synthetic unity of apperception, to which all the ideas given to me are subordinated, and it is the synthesis that must subordinate them to it.
§ 17. The principle of the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest principle of any application of the understanding
The highest principle about the possibility of any contemplation in its relation to sensibility states, in accordance with transcendental aesthetics, that everything diverse in contemplation is subject to the formal conditions of space and time. In relation to the understanding, the highest principle about the possibility of intuition states that everything diverse in them is subject to the conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception[41]. All the manifold representations of contemplation are subordinated to the first of these principles, insofar as they are given to us,
and the second, since they must be able to be
connected
in one consciousness, since without this connection nothing can be thought or known through them, because in this case these representations would not have a common act of apperception,
I think
, and therefore would not be connected in one self-awareness.
Reason
there is, generally speaking, the capacity for
knowledge.
Knowledge lies in a certain relationship between these representations and an object.
An object
is that in the concept of which
is united
. But any unification of ideas requires the unity of consciousness in their synthesis. Thus, the unity of consciousness is what constitutes only the relation of ideas to an object, therefore, their objective significance, therefore, their transformation into knowledge; the very possibility of understanding is based on this unity.
So, the principle of the original synthetic
the unity of apperception is the first pure rational knowledge; all further use of the understanding is based on it;
at the same time, it is completely independent of any conditions of sensory intuition. Thus, space, the pure form of external sensory intuition, is not yet knowledge at all; it provides a priori only the manifold in intuition for possible knowledge. And in order to cognize something in space, for example a line, I must draw
it, therefore, synthetically realize a certain connection of a given diversity, so that the unity of this action is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the concept of a line), and only thanks to this an object (a certain space) is cognized.
The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, the objective condition of all knowledge; not only do I myself need it for the knowledge of the object, but also any intuition, in order to become an object for me,
must obey this condition, since otherwise, and without this synthesis, the diverse would not be united in one consciousness.
This last proposition, as has been said, is itself analytical in nature, although it makes synthetic unity the condition of all thinking; in fact, it only says that all my
representations in any given intuition must be subject to a condition only under which I can classify them as
my
representations in the identical
I
and can therefore unite them through the general expression
I think
as synthetically connected in one apperception.
However, this principle is not a principle for every possible understanding at all, but only for that understanding, thanks to the pure apperception of which I exist
nothing diverse has yet been given. An understanding, thanks to whose self-consciousness the manifold in contemplation would also be given, an understanding, thanks to whose representation the objects of this representation would also exist, would not need a special act of synthesis of the manifold for the unity of consciousness, while the human understanding, which only thinks, but does not contemplate , needs this act. But for the human understanding this principle is inevitably the first principle, so that the human understanding cannot even form for itself the slightest concept of any other possible understanding that would itself intuit or, although it would have sensuous intuition, but of a different kind than intuition, underlying space and time.
§ 18. What is the objective unity of self-consciousness
Transcendental unity
apperception is that unity thanks to which all the diversity given in contemplation is united into the concept of an object.
Therefore it is called objective,
and must be distinguished from
the subjective unity
of consciousness, which is
the determination of the inner sense
by which the said manifold in intuition is empirically given for such a connection.
Whether I can empirically
aware of the manifold as simultaneous or sequential depends on circumstances or empirical conditions.
Therefore, the empirical unity of consciousness through the association of ideas is itself a phenomenon and completely accidental. The pure form of contemplation in time, simply as contemplation in general, containing within itself a given diversity, is subordinated to the original unity of consciousness only because the diversity in contemplation necessarily relates to one and the same I think;
consequently, it is subordinated to the original unity of consciousness through the pure synthesis of the understanding, which a priori lies at the basis of the empirical synthesis. Only this initial unity has objective significance, while the empirical unity of apperception, which we do not consider here and which, moreover, is only something derived from the first unity under given specific conditions, has only subjective significance. One connects the idea of a particular word with one thing, and the other with another; Moreover, the unity of consciousness in what is empirical in nature is not necessary and does not have universal significance in relation to what is given.
§ 19. The logical form of all judgments consists in the objective unity of apperception of the concepts contained in them
I have never been satisfied with the definition of judgment in general given by those logicians who say that a judgment is the idea of a relationship between two concepts. Without entering into disputes here about the fallacy of this definition (although many serious consequences for logic arose from it), which consists in the fact that it is suitable only for categorical[42], but not for hypothetical and divisive judgments (since they contain not a relationship between concepts, but a relationship between judgments), I will only note that this definition does not indicate what this relationship consists of.
Examining more carefully the relation between the knowledge given in each judgment, and distinguishing this relation as belonging to the understanding from the relation consistent with the laws of the reproductive faculty of the imagination (and having only subjective validity), I find that a judgment is nothing more than a way of bringing data knowledge to the objective
unity of apperception.
The connective is
in a judgment has as its purpose precisely to distinguish the objective unity of given ideas from the subjective.
It denotes the relation of representations to initial apperception and its necessary unity,
even if the judgment itself were empirical, and therefore accidental, as, for example, the judgment
of bodies being heavy.
By this I do not want to say that these representations
necessarily
belong
to each other
in empirical intuition, but I want to say that they belong to each other
due to the necessary unity
of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions, that is, according to the principles of the objective determination of all representations, since from them knowledge can arise, and all these principles follow from the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception.
Only thanks to this does a judgment arise from the indicated relation ,
that is, a relation that has
objective significance
and is sufficiently different from the relation of the same ideas, which would have only subjective significance, for example, according to the laws of association. According to the laws of association, I could only say: if I carry some body, I feel the pressure of gravity, but I could not say: it, this body, is something heavy, therefore, assert that these two representations are connected in the object, i.e. That is, regardless of the states of the subject, and do not exist together only (no matter how often this is repeated) in perception.
§ 20. All sensory intuitions are subject to categories as conditions, the only ones under which their diversity can be united into one consciousness
The manifold given in sensory intuition is necessarily subordinated to the original synthetic unity of apperception, because only through it is unity
contemplation (§ 17).
But that action of the understanding, by which the manifold in given representations (it makes no difference whether they are intuitions or concepts) is subsumed under apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments (§ 19). Consequently, every diversity, insofar as it is given in a single empirical intuition, is determined
in relation to one of the logical functions of judgment, thanks to which it is precisely that which is brought to a single consciousness in general.
The categories
are nothing other than these functions of judgment, since the manifold in a given intuition is determined in relation to them (§ 10). Consequently, the manifold in any given intuition is necessarily subordinated to the categories.
§ 21. Note
The manifold contained in the intuition, which I call mine, is represented by the synthesis of the understanding as belonging to the necessary
unity of self-consciousness, and this occurs thanks to the category[43].
Consequently, the category shows that the empirical consciousness of the manifold, given in a single intuition, is just as subordinate to pure self-consciousness a priori, as empirical intuition is subordinate to pure sensory intuition, which also exists a priori. – In the above statement, therefore, the beginning of the deduction of
pure concepts of the understanding is given, in which, in view of the fact that categories arise only in the understanding,
independent of sensibility,
I must also abstract from the way in which diversity is given for empirical intuition, and pay attention only to unity , which is introduced into contemplation by the understanding through the category. Based on the way in which empirical intuition is given in sensibility, it will be shown later (§ 26) that its unity is nothing other than the unity that the category prescribes, according to the previous § 20, to the manifold in a given intuition in general; in this way the a priori validity of the categories in relation to all objects of our senses will be explained and, therefore, only then will the goal of deduction be fully achieved.
However, I could not abstract from one circumstance in the above proof, namely, that the manifold for contemplation must be given
even before the synthesis of reason and independently of this synthesis;
but how remains uncertain here. In fact, if I were to imagine an understanding that would itself intuit (such as, for example, the divine understanding, which would not represent given objects, but would give or produce them through its representations), then categories in relation to such knowledge would not have no meaning. They are only rules for such an understanding, the whole capacity of which consists in thinking, that is, in action, by which the synthesis of the manifold, given to it in contemplation from the outside, leads to the unity of apperception, so that this understanding in itself does not know anything,
but only connects and arranges the material for knowledge, namely, intuition, which must be given to him through the object. As for the peculiarities of our understanding, namely, that it a priori realizes the unity of apperception only through categories and only with the help of such and such species and such and such a number of them, no other grounds can be given for this circumstance, just as it is impossible to justify why we have precisely such and such and not other functions of judgment or why time and space are the only forms of intuition possible for us.
§ 22. The category has no other application for the knowledge of things, except for application to objects of experience
Think
to perceive an object and
to cognize
an object are, therefore, not the same thing.
For knowledge it is necessary to have, firstly, a concept through which an object (category) is generally thought of, and, secondly, intuition through which an object is given; in fact, if the concept could not be given a corresponding intuition at all, then it would be a thought in form, but without any object and through it no knowledge of any thing would be possible, because in this case, as far as I know, there would and could not be anything to which my thought could be applied. But every contemplation possible for us is sensual (aesthetics), therefore, the thought of an object in general through a pure rational concept can turn into knowledge for us only when this concept relates to objects of the senses. Sensory intuition is either pure intuition (space and time), or empirical intuition of what through sensation is represented in space and time directly as real. Through the definition of pure contemplation, we can obtain a priori knowledge about objects (in mathematics), but only from their form, as about phenomena; whether there can be things that must be contemplated in this form remains unknown. Consequently, all mathematical concepts are not knowledge in themselves, unless we assume that there are things that can appear to us only in accordance with the form of this pure sensory intuition. But in space and time, things
are given only insofar as they are perceptions (representations accompanied by sensations), therefore, through empirical representations.
Consequently, pure concepts of the understanding, even if they are applied a priori to intuitions (as in mathematics), give knowledge only insofar as these intuitions and, therefore, the concepts of the understanding through them can be applied to empirical intuitions. Consequently, categories through intuition provide us with knowledge about things only through their possible application to empirical intuition,
that is, they serve only for the possibility of
empirical knowledge,
which is called
experience.
Consequently, categories are used for the knowledge of things only insofar as these things are considered as objects of possible experience.
§ 23
The above proposition is extremely important: it determines the limits of the application of pure concepts of the understanding in relation to objects, just as transcendental aesthetics determined the limits of the application of the pure form of our sensory intuition. Space and time, as conditions of possibility of how objects can be given to us, are significant only for objects of sense, therefore, only for objects of experience. Beyond these limits they do not represent anything, since they are only in feelings and have no reality outside them. Pure concepts of the understanding are free from this limitation and extend to objects of intuition in general, no matter whether it is similar to our intuition or not, as long as it is sensual and not intellectual. However, this extension of concepts beyond our
sensory intuition does not bring us any benefit, since in this case they are empty concepts of objects, which do not give us any reason to judge whether these objects are possible or not; they are only forms of thought without objective reality, because we have no intuitions at our disposal to which the synthetic unity of apperception, containing only these concepts, could be applied, so that they could determine the object. Only our sensory and empirical contemplations can give them meaning and meaning.
Therefore, if we admit the object of the non-sensible
of intuition as a given, then we can, of course, represent it through all the predicates already contained in the assumption that
nothing belonging to sensory intuition is inherent in it,
therefore, that it is not extended or is not located in space, that its presence is not staying in time, that no changes occur in it (sequence of definitions in time), etc. However, if I only indicate what properties the contemplation of an object
does not have,
and cannot say what it contains, then it is not real knowledge, because in this case I did not even imagine the possibility of an object for my pure concept of understanding, because I could not give any intuition corresponding to it, I can only say that our intuitions are not valid for it. But the most important thing here is that no category could be applied to such something, for example, the concept of substance, that is, the concept of something that can exist only as a subject, but not simply as a predicate; whether there could be a thing corresponding to this definition of thought, I would know nothing about this if empirical intuition did not give me cases for applying [this concept]. However, this will be discussed in more detail below.
§ 24. On the application of categories to objects of sense in general
Pure concepts of the understanding relate through the understanding alone to objects of intuition in general, while it is unclear whether this intuition is ours or not, as long as it is sensual, but that is precisely why pure concepts of the understanding are only forms of thought,
through which no definite object is yet known.
The synthesis, or binding, of the diverse in them relates, as has been said, only to the unity of apperception and thereby constitutes the basis of the possibility of a priori knowledge, insofar as it is based on reason; Consequently, this synthesis is not only transcendental, but also purely intellectual. But since our basis a priori is a certain form of sensory intuition, based on the receptivity of the faculty of representation (sensibility), then the understanding as spontaneity can determine the inner sense thanks to the diversity of these representations in accordance with the synthetic unity of apperception and thus a priori think the synthetic the unity of apperception of the diverse [contents of] sensory contemplation
as a condition to which all objects of our (human) contemplation must necessarily be subordinated. It is in this way that categories, being only forms of thought, acquire objective reality, that is, they are applied to objects that can be given to us in contemplation, but only as phenomena, for we are capable of having a priori contemplation of phenomena alone.
This synthesis
of the manifold [contents of] sensory intuition, possible and necessary a priori, can be called
figurative
(synthesis speciosa) in contrast to the synthesis that would be thought of in mere categories in relation to the manifold [contents] of intuition in general and can be called an understanding connection (synthesis intellectualis).
Both synthesis are transcendental
not only because they themselves occur a priori, but also because they form the basis for the possibility of other a priori knowledge.
However, figurative synthesis, if it relates only to the original synthetic unity of apperception, that is, to that transcendental unity that is thought in categories, should, in contrast to a purely intellectual connection, be called a transcendental synthesis of imagination. Imagination
there is the ability to imagine an object also
without its presence
in contemplation.
Since all our intuitions are sensuous, the faculty of imagination, in view of the subjective condition under which alone it can give corresponding intuitions to the concepts of the understanding, belongs to sensibility; however, its synthesis is a manifestation of spontaneity, which determines, and is not only determined like feelings, therefore, it can a priori determine a feeling by its form in accordance with the unity of apperception; in this sense, imagination is the ability to determine a priori sensibility, and its synthesis of intuitions according to categories
must be a transcendental synthesis
of the faculty of imagination;
this is the action of the understanding on sensibility and its first application (as well as the basis of all other methods of application) to objects of contemplation possible for us.
This synthesis, as a figurative one, differs from the intellectual synthesis produced by reason alone, without any help from the imagination. Since the faculty of imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes also call it the productive
faculty of imagination and thereby distinguish it from
the reproductive
faculty of imagination, the synthesis of which is subject only to empirical laws, namely the laws of association, as a result of which it does not in any way contribute to explaining the possibility of a priori knowledge and therefore is subject to consideration not in transcendental philosophy, but in psychology.
* * *
Here it is appropriate to explain one paradox that should strike everyone when presenting the form of internal feeling (§ 6): the internal feeling represents even ourselves to consciousness only as we are to ourselves, and not as we exist in ourselves, because we contemplate ourselves ourselves only in the way we are internally affected;
this seems contradictory, since we would have to be passive towards ourselves;
Therefore, systems of psychology usually identify the inner sense
with the faculty
of apperception
(while we carefully distinguish them from each other).
The inner feeling is determined by the understanding and its initial ability to connect the diverse [contents] of intuition, that is, to bring it under apperception (on which the very possibility of understanding is based). However, with us humans, the understanding itself is not the ability to intuit, and even if intuitions were given in sensibility, the intellect is not capable of receiving them into itself,
in order, so to speak, to connect the manifold [contents] of his
own
contemplation;
Therefore, the synthesis of the understanding, considered in itself, is nothing other than the unity of action, conscious of the understanding as such, also without sensibility, but capable of internally determining sensibility in relation to the manifold that can be given to it in accordance with the form of its intuition. Consequently, the understanding, under the name of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination,
produces on
the passive
subject,
faculty
it is, an action about which we have every reason to assert that it influences the inner sense.
Apperception and its synthetic unity are not at all identical with the internal sense: as the source of any connection, apperception refers, under the name of categories, to the manifold [contents] of intuitions in general,
[i.e.
e.] to objects in general, before any sensory contemplation, while the inner feeling contains only a form
of contemplation, although without the connection of the diversity in it, therefore, it does not yet contain any
specific
contemplation, which becomes possible only through awareness determining the inner feeling with the help of the transcendental action of the imagination (the synthetic influence of the mind on the inner feeling), which I call figurative synthesis.
Manuscript analysis
The philosopher interprets self-consciousness as a purely spontaneous act, indicating that pure apperception belongs to the highest cognitive abilities. In connection with such ideas, it is not surprising that Kant sometimes identifies the unity of apperception (original) and understanding.
An analysis of the philosopher’s manuscripts showed that on the eve of the presentation of his work “Critique of Pure Reason” he interpreted the “I” in the spirit of rational psychology. This means that “I” is a thing in itself, accessible to apperception (direct intellectual contemplation). The rejection of this position subsequently led to inconsistencies in the structure of the argument.
Later, the concept of “transcendental apperception” and its unity served as the basis for the creation of Fichte’s scientific works.
Scope of use of the concept
In general, this phenomenon has been considered by many philosophers and representatives of other sciences. It is widely used in psychology, medicine, sociology and other areas of human existence. Kant combined the capabilities of people. He distinguished empirical apperception, which means to know oneself, and transcendental, which points to pure perception of the world. For example, Herbart I. speaks of this concept as a process of cognition, a person obtaining new knowledge and combining it with existing knowledge. Wundt W. characterizes apperception as a mechanism that structures personal experience in the human mind. Adler A. became famous for his opinion that a person sees what he wants to see. In other words, he notices only what fits his concept of the world. This is how a certain model of personality behavior is formed.
Such a concept as the transcendental unity of apperception, in simple words, characterizes a person’s ability to interpret his own worldview. This is his personal attitude or assessment of the world and people around him. This understanding is present in medicine and sociology.
Apperceptive hallucinations
When apperceptive perception fails, it can lead to distortion and further problems. If we consider the cause of such a phenomenon as apperceptive hallucinations, then it is worth noting that they are of two types and both are the result of mental disorders. But more on that a little later.
First you need to understand what a hallucination is. This is a perception disorder that entails the emergence of various images without the presence of real objects. Hallucinations can be not only visual, but also auditory (for example, voices in the head), tactile, olfactory, that is, divided by sense organ.
Apperceptive hallucinations have a clear difference in the mechanism of their appearance from other known ones. This kind of hallucination occurs with the help of a person’s volitional effort. He, as it were, forces himself to experience them and passionately desires it. For example, a person suffering from schizophrenia causes himself to experience auditory hallucinations and after a while he actually begins to hear voices in his head and other sounds.
So, let’s move on to consider two types of apperceptive hallucinations:
- Abstract phontoremia
. It consists of taking away your own thoughts and hammering others’ thoughts into your head. - Specific phontoremia
. Appears against the background of his own memories, which seem to have surfaced earlier in hallucinations.
Differences
Such an interesting science as rational psychology was refuted by Kant. In it, the concept of transcendental apperception with its unity is not confused with the transcendental subject, its bearer, about whom practically nothing is known. It is on the erroneous identification of these terms that rational psychology is based. It is believed that this concept itself is only a form of thinking, different from the transcendental subject in the same way that thought is different from a thing.
It is very important to note that impressions boil down, first of all, to one general idea of the subject. Based on it, basic and simple concepts are developed. In this sense, Kant meant the synthesis of apperception. At the same time, he argued that the forms of this synthesis, combinations of impressions, the concept of space, time and basic categories are the innate property of the human spirit. This does not follow from observation.
With the help of such a synthesis, a new impression, thanks to comparison and juxtaposition, is introduced into the circle of previously developed concepts and impressions retained in memory. This is how it gets its place between them.
Searches and installations
Selective perception, or apperception, examples of which were given above, indicates an attentive and thoughtful perception of the surrounding world, based on one’s own experience, knowledge, fantasies and other views. All these categories are different for different people. First of all, a person looks at what corresponds to his goals, motives and desires. Through the prism of his passion, he studies and describes the world around him.
If a person has a strong feeling within himself, which is called “I want,” then he begins to search for something that corresponds to his desire and contributes to the realization of his plans. The sensations are also influenced by the attitudes and mental state of the individual.
Based on the fact that the synthetic unity of apperception leads a person to understand the world around him through the prism of his mental images and sensations, the opposite can be said. For example, for each person with whom communication occurs, the other person develops one or another attitude towards her. This is social apperception. It refers to the influence of people on each other through ideas, opinions and joint activities.
The very concept of apperception is divided into types: cultural, biological and historical. It can be congenital and acquired. Apperception is very important for human life. The person himself has the ability to change due to the influence of new information, to realize, perceive, and supplement his knowledge and experience. It is clear that as knowledge changes, the person himself changes. A person’s thoughts influence his character, behavior, and ability to put forward hypotheses regarding other people, phenomena and objects.
The philosophical concept of apperception, the definition of which tells us about the conscious perception of everything around us on the basis of personal experience and knowledge, is of Latin origin. It is widely used in psychology. The result of such a process will be clarity and distinctness of the elements of consciousness. This is a key property of the human psyche, expressing the predetermination of the perception of phenomena and objects of the external world in accordance with the characteristics of psychological experience, accumulated knowledge and the state of the individual in particular.
The term apperception was first proposed by the German philosopher and mathematician G. V. Leibniz. He also studied logic, mechanics, physics, legal science, history, was a scientist, philosopher and diplomat, inventor and linguist. Leibniz is the founder and first president of the Berlin Academy of Sciences. The scientist was also a foreign member of the French Academy of Sciences.
Leibniz used this term to designate consciousness, reflective acts that give a person the thought of “I”. Apperception is different from perception, unconscious perception. He explained the difference between perception-perception (the internal state of the monad) and apperception-consciousness (reflective knowledge of this state within a person). Leibniz G.V. introduced the difference between these concepts in a polemic with the Cartesians, who accepted unconscious perceptions as “nothing”.
How do different scientists see this concept?
Speaking about apperception, all scientists agree that it is a mental ability with the help of which a person recognizes the ideas that come to him as his own. This is an actual perception with the additional awareness of the person that it is based on his personal impressions;
However, in philosophy and psychology there are many interpretations of this fundamental concept. Let's get to know some of them:
according to Kant, this is a property of human consciousness that accompanies the process of voluntary self-knowledge. Kant believed that this property is inherent in every person, therefore he united all our judgments into the “transcendental unity of apperception”; Leibniz used the term "perception" to describe an impression that has not reached consciousness. A person receives such a “simple” perception through the senses.
It is important not to confuse this term with the concept of “social perception”, which refers to social psychology. Apperception means a sensation that a person is already able to understand; famous psychologist Alfred Adler called a person’s individual ideas about the world around him the term “apperception scheme”
His words are well known: “A person always sees what he wants to see.” Adler believed that apperception is a personal concept of the surrounding world that determines human behavior; in Herbart's psychology it is the merging of a new idea with those already in consciousness through their change. This scientist compared apperception to food digested in the stomach; in Wundt's psychology, it is the mental process in which a perception or thought is most clearly realized; transcendental apperception, as a separate concept, connects new qualities with past experience; in general psychology, apperception is understood as any perception; in child psychology and pedagogy, the transcendental unity of apperception is a unique tool. It allows the child to learn successfully by combining new skills with everyday experience; Medical psychologists call this concept an individual’s interpretation of his feelings.
Modern psychologists adhere to the point of view that apperceptive perception is always a reflection of personality. Therefore, knowing what interests a given person, a psychologist can understand what she is like. So, we can talk about apperception when the inner “I” participates in active perception. The apperception scheme proposed by Adler is considered today one of the key concepts of cognitive psychology.
It is known that the feelings of any person do not reflect real facts, but only his subjective ideas that come from the outside world. This pattern of perception constantly reinforces itself. For example, when a person is afraid, he tends to see a threat everywhere, which further strengthens his belief that the world around him is constantly threatening him.
The apperceptive process clearly demonstrates that the individual experience accumulated by a person is always involved in mental activity. Human behavior is never passive: it always depends not only on the accumulation of new experience, but also on the impact on the perception of old experience. This is a manifestation of apperception in the mental life of each of us.
Development
Subsequently, the concept of apperception received its greatest development in German philosophy and psychology. This was facilitated by the works of I. Kant, I. Herbart, W. Wundt and others. But even if there were differences in understanding, this concept was considered as an ability of the soul, spontaneously developing and being the source of a single stream of consciousness.
Leibniz limited apperception to the highest level of cognition. Kant did not think so, and distinguished between transcendental and empirical apperception. Herbart already introduces the concept of apperception into pedagogy. He interprets it as the subjects’ awareness of new information under the influence of a stock of experience and knowledge, which he calls the apperceptive mass.
Wundt turned apperception into a universal principle that explains the beginning of all mental life in a person, into a special mental causation, an internal force that determines the behavior of the individual.
In Gestalt psychology, apperception is reduced to the structural integrity of perception, which depends on primary structures that arise and change depending on their internal laws. Perception itself is an active process where information is received and used to formulate hypotheses and test them. The nature of such hypotheses depends on the content of past experience.
When the perception of an object occurs, traces of the past are also activated. Thus, the same object can be perceived and reproduced in different ways. The richer a particular person’s experience, the more intense his perception will be, the more he will be able to see in the event.
What a person perceives, the content of what is perceived, depends on the task assigned by this very person and the motives of his activity. The content of the reaction is significantly influenced by the subject's attitude factor. It develops under the direct influence of the experience that was gained earlier. This is a kind of readiness to perceive a new object in a certain way. This phenomenon was studied by D. Uznadze together with his colleagues. It characterizes the dependence of the perception itself on the state of the subject, which is determined by previous experience. The influence of the installation extends to the operation of different analyzers and is wide-ranging. The process of perception itself involves feelings that can change the meaning of the assessment. If there is an emotional attitude towards an object, then it can easily become an object of perception.
Bottom line
Apperception creates an experience that a person then uses in the future. Depending on the assessment you gave to one event, you will have a specific opinion and idea about it. It will differ from the views of other people who gave the event a different assessment. The result is a world that is diverse for all living creatures.
Social apperception is based on people's assessment of each other. Depending on this assessment, a person chooses a specific individual as a friend, favorite partner, or turns him into an enemy. Public opinion also takes part here, which rarely lends itself to analysis and is perceived by a person as information that should be unconditionally accepted and followed.
